Let us start with eight points that, in my opinion, characterize the war of the USA and Israel against Iran:

1. Trump’s feelings and sensations are not sufficient for the Law, in the sense they are not enough to declare a war (I am referring to the threat from Iran).
2. Preventive wars are illegal under every international legal profile.
3. This war, by the USA and Israel, violated Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.
4. Regarding self-defense: there is a dispute over what it actually is. Example: planes are approaching, and if you shoot one down just as they have decided not to attack, in that case you are guilty; you are on the wrong side.
5. The Russian case was different: in Donbass, there was a long, documented record of mistreatment against Russians in Ukraine, an “Orange” Revolution against Russian representatives; Russians were targeted and killed by Ukrainians; there were attacks on Donbass, and so on. Any similar took place in Iran?
6. The USA and Iran were extremely close to resolving every controversial issue: Oman declared this, and it has never been contradicted.
7. Iran may now be very close to a nuclear bomb.
8. The resignation of Joe Kent: he stated that there was “no imminent threat” from Iran.

Below, I propose a systematic analysis and a synthesis of the eight points, reorganized according to a logic that ranges from the international legal framework to specific diplomatic and military cases. The discourse is articulated along three main guidelines: the legitimacy of the use of force, the comparison between geopolitical crises, and the imminence of nuclear risk.

1. The Legal Framework: Violations and Illegality (Points 2, 3, 4).

The core of the argument is based on the distinction between defense and aggression according to international law (which, in reality, does not properly exist…):

• violation of the UN Charter: the military action by the USA and Israel is a direct violation of Articles 2 (prohibition of the threat or use of force against territorial integrity) and 51 (which limits the use of force to self-defense only in the event of an armed attack already launched);
• illegitimacy of Preventive War: “Preventive war” has no standing in international law; it is considered illegal under every profile, as force can only be used to respond to an attack, not to prevent a hypothetical one;
• The Ambiguity of Self-Defense: the concept of self-defense is often manipulated. The example of the aircraft emphasizes that striking an enemy who has decided not to attack transforms the defender into an aggressor, placing them “on the wrong side.”

2. The Political and Intelligence Factor (Points 1, 8, 6).

The analysis shifts the focus to subjective motivations versus objective data:

• Subjectivity vs. Law: a leader’s “feelings” or perceptions (Trump) cannot constitute a sufficient legal basis for declaring war. The law requires concrete evidence of a threat, not states of mind;
• Absence of Imminent Threat: this position is supported by figures within the American apparatus: Joe Kent’s resignation and his statements confirm that there was no “imminent threat” from Iran that justified the escalation;
• Interrupted Diplomacy: a missed opportunity is noted; according to Oman’s mediation (which has never been contradicted), the USA and Iran were close to a diplomatic resolution of all controversies—a scenario that subsequently collapsed in favor of the military option.

3. Comparative Analysis and Consequences (Points 5, 7).

Finally, let us examine the regional context and future risks:

• Distinction from the Russian Case: there is a clear line of demarcation between the Iranian situation and the conflict in Donbass. While in the Ukrainian case we have a long-documented record of violence, revolutions (“Orange”), and attacks against the Russian population, what is found in the Iranian context to justify external intervention? The oppression of (a part of) the Iranian population was not really present in the USA-Iran negotiations.
• The Nuclear Consequence: the paradoxical effect of the escalation and the breakdown of agreements is that Iran now finds itself, potentially, closer than ever to possessing nuclear weapons—even by purchasing them at the “atomic bazaar”—exacerbating the very risk that the intervention theoretically intended to thwart (see the book used as the representative image of this article).

Therefore, the conflict against Iran lacks solid legal foundations (violation of the UN Charter), is based on subjective political perceptions rather than real threats (the Joe Kent case), and is strategically counterproductive, having interrupted a promising diplomatic path (Oman mediation) and accelerated the Iranian nuclear race. The comparison with the Ukrainian crisis serves to highlight the absence of humanitarian prerequisites or the protection of minorities in the case of Iran.